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 TADBIR URUS KORPORAT DAN HUBUNGAN POLITIK KE ATAS 
EKSPROPRIASI KEKAYAAN DI KALANGAN KUMPULAN 
PERNIAGAAN INDONEISA 
 
 
ABSTRAK 
 
Satu dekad selepas krisis kewangan Asia 1997/98, Indonesia masih menghadapi 
tahap keberkesanan yang rendah dalam aspek penguatkuasaan tadbir urus korporat. 
Masalah ekspropriasi kekayaan masih berterusan atas sebab ketumpuan pemilikan 
yang tinggi, dominasi kumpulan perniagaan dan penguasaan syarikat-syarikat oleh 
keluarga. Tujuan keseluruhan kajian ini adalah untuk menyelidiki peranan 
mekanisme tadbir urus korporat dan hubungan politik untuk menjelaskan takat 
ekspropriasi kekayaan melalui urus niaga dengan pihak yand berkaitan. Urus niaga 
dengan pihak yang berkaitan berfungsi sebagai proksi ekspropriasi kekayaan yang 
boleh dibahagikan kepada piutang pihak berkaitan, hutang pihak berkaitan, jualan 
pihak yang berkaitan dan belian pihak berkaitan. Sampel kajian ini adalah 127 
syarikat awam yang tersenarai di Bursa Saham Indonesia sepanjang tempoh 1999-
2008 yang menghasilkan 1270 tahun-pemerhatian syarikat. Analisis kuantitatif 
dilakukan melalui regresi data panel dinamik. Keputusan kajian menunjukkan 
bahawa beberapa mekanisme dalaman tadbir urus korporat gagal untuk 
melaksanakan peranan pemantauan terhadap ekspropriasi kekayaan. Struktur 
pemilikan muktamad dan pengarah berganda cenderung untuk menyokong 
ekspropriasi kekayaan. Kompensasi pengarah dan penyelia berganda gagal untuk 
bertindak sebagai mekanisme pemantauan yang berkesan untuk mengekang 
ekspropriasi kekayaan. Pembolehubah hubungan politik cenderung pula untuk 
memudahkan ekspropriasi kekayaan yang sekaligus bertindak sebagai halangan atas 
keberkesanan mekanisme dalaman tadbir urus korporat. Penyelidikan ini berjaya 
menghasilkan beberapa sumbangan. Dari segi sumbangan secara teori, penyelidikan 
 ini telah mengkaji kepentingan masalah agensi di antara pemegang saham majoriti 
dan minoriti dalam menjelaskan peranan tadbir urus korporat atas ekspropriasi 
kekayaan. Kajian ini juga mendapati sokongan untuk model ‟path dependence’ 
tadbir urus korporat, di mana keunikan faktor institusi suatu negara seperti sistem 
politik juga turut menyumbang ke arah psoses pembentukan tadbir urus korporat. 
Kajian ini mendapati bahawa hubungan politik bertindak sebagai penhalang bagi 
pembangunan tadbir urus korporat yang baik. Dari segi sumbangan praktikal, kajian 
ini telah mengemukakan beberapa cadangan dasar untuk menjadikan fungsi lembaga 
penyeliaan lebih profesional dan penetapan peraturan mengenai bilangan maksimum 
pengarah berganda. Merujuk kepada transaksi dengan pihak berkaitan, kajian ini 
turut mencadangkan penambahan dalam keperluan pendedahan mengenai transaksi 
tersebut.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 CORPORATE GOVERNANCE AND POLITICAL CONNECTIONS ON 
WEALTH EXPROPRIATION AMONG INDONESIAN BUSINESS GROUPS 
 
 
 
ABSTRACT 
 
 
A decade after the 1997/98 Asian Financial crisis, Indonesia is still experiencing a 
low score on the effectiveness of corporate governance enforcement. The problem of 
wealth expropriation still persists due to high ownership concentration, domination 
of business groups and predominantly family-controlled firms. The overall objective 
of this study is to examine the role of corporate governance mechanisms and 
political connections to explain the extent of wealth expropriation through related 
party transactions. Related party transactions serves as a proxy for wealth 
expropriation and is examined from related lending, related borrowing, related party 
sales and related party purchases perspectives. The sample of this study was 127 
public listed companies in the Indonesian Stock Exchange during the period of 1999-
2008, resulted in 1270 firm-year observations. Dynamic panel data regression was 
used to test the hypotheses. The results of this study show that several internal 
governance mechanisms fail to discharge their monitoring role to wealth 
expropriation. Ultimate ownership structures and multiple directorships are more 
likely to support wealth expropriation. Director compensation and multiple 
commissionerships fail to act as effective monitoring mechanisms to curb wealth 
expropriation. Political connections tends to facilitate wealth expropriation and also 
acts as an impediment to the effectiveness of internal governance mechanisms. This 
research highlighted several contributions. In terms of theoretical contribution, this 
study examines the importance of agency problems between the majority and 
minority shareholders in explaining the role of corporate governance on wealth 
 expropriation. This study also supports the path dependence model of corporate 
governance, where the uniqueness of a country„s characteristics such as institutional 
factor also shapes the direction of the governance process. This study finds that 
political connections acts as an impediment to the development of good corporate 
governance. As for the practical contribution, this research proposes some policy 
recommendations to make the board of commissioners function more professional 
and also calls on the use of regulation to limit the maximum number of directorships. 
Regarding related party transactions, this study suggests increased disclosure 
requirements concerning these transactions. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 CHAPTER 1 
INTRODUCTION 
 
 
1.1 Background of the Study 
Studies on corporate governance have received great attention in recent years. In 
Asia, the issue of corporate governance has attracted significant consideration 
especially a decade after the Asian financial crisis which happened in 1997. Poor 
corporate governance is mentioned to be the cause of the significant woes toward the 
collapse of the banking and corporate sectors and the inability to attract investments. 
Therefore, the implementation of good corporate governance practices is regarded as 
the key to achieving sustainable growth; its accomplishment, however, requires the 
commitment from all countries, including Indonesia. 
Following the above crisis, the Indonesian government has been promoting 
investment as the basis of economic growth. Consequently, the pursuits of good 
corporate governance to attract domestic and international investors have become a 
crucial priority. 
On the contrary, empirical evidence generally reveals that the performance of 
Indonesian‟s corporate governance practice is still poor (ADB, 2004; Klapper & 
Love, 2004; Standard & Poors, 2004). According to Husnan (2001), the practice of 
corporate governance in Indonesia is highly influenced by its unique institutional 
context. The institutional settings for the majority companies in Indonesia among 
others are concentration of ownership in the hands of family business groups, the 
prevalence of pyramid structure, and the lack of shareholder protection (Husnan, 
2001). 
 
 1.1.1 Indonesian Corporate Governance System: Development and Challenges  
During a decade after the Asian Financial Crisis 1997, the government of 
Indonesia has been promoting and enforcing good governance practices among 
companies. In the year 2001, the National Committee on Corporate Governance 
(NCCG) established the code of conduct of good corporate governance. This code 
was adopted from corporate governance principles developed by the Organization 
for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD). The code was revised in 2006 
(KNKG, 2006). The country has also developed a plethora of codes of best practice 
for different sectors, companies and professions which include public governance 
(i.e., government), banks, state-owned enterprises and actuaries. The pursuit of the 
Indonesian code of corporate governance, however, is neither mandatory nor adhere 
to the principle of compliance. It is merely a set of principles and general guidelines 
recommended as best practices for a wide range of companies, including unlisted 
ones (ACGA, 2010).  
While some corporate governance indicators have improved since the 
establishment of the code, the need to instill transparency and accountability are still 
very challenging. Among the main challenges of corporate governance in Indonesia 
are the weaknesses in its legal and judicial system, and poor protection of minority 
investors. The importance of minority investors‟ protection is highlighted by a 
survey conducted by Forum for Corporate Governance in Indonesia (FCGI) in 2004. 
According to the survey, investors were willing to pay up to 17% premium for 
investing in firms which have good corporate governance. On the other hand, a deep 
discount of 30% was imposed for firms controlled by a single or few domestic 
owners with poor governance (Nam and Nam, 2004). 
 A recent survey of corporate governance quality in Asia by Asian Corporate 
Governance Association in collaboration with Credit Lyonnais SA (CLSA) (2007, 
2010) once again placed Indonesia at the bottom rank compared to its neighboring 
countries as presented in Table 1.1.  
 
Table 1.1 
Corporate governance quality score for Asian countries 
Rank Market 
Rules & 
Practices 
Enforce 
IGAAP Political & 
Regulatory 
Culture 
Total 
Score 
„07 „10 „07 „10 „07 „10 „07 „10 „07 „10 „07 „10 
1 Singapore 70 65 50 60 88 88 65 69 53 53 65 67 
2 Hongkong 60 59 56 63 83 80 73 67 61 54 67 65 
3 India 59 46 38 36 75 63 50 54 56 43 56 49 
4 Japan 43 45 46 53 72 75 52 62 49 53 52 57 
5 Taiwan 49 50 47 47 70 78 60 56 46 46 54 55 
6 Thailand 58 56 36 42 70 73 31 54 39 49 47 55 
7 Malaysia 44 49 35 38 78 80 56 60 33 32 49 52 
8 China 43 47 33 36 73 75 52 56 25 30 45 49 
9 Korea 45 43 39 28 68 78 48 44 43 33 49 45 
10 Indonesia 39 39 22 28 65 67 35 33 25 32 37 40 
11 Philippines 39 35 19 15 75 75 38 37 36 32 41 37 
Source: Asian Corporate Governance Association (ACGA) and CLSA Asia-Pacific Markets 
(2007& 2010) 
 
As depicted in Table 1.1, Indonesia was ranked at the 11
th
 position in 2007 and 10
th
 
in 2010. Indonesia only beats Philippines but still lags behind Singapore, Malaysia, 
and Thailand. Further analysis indicates that the low total score on corporate 
governance was mainly contributed by the poor scores on the enforcement of good 
corporate governance practices, political and regulatory environment and the 
hindrance of business culture. These three categories are the key issues of concern in 
the development of Indonesian corporate governance. The result also indicates that 
the implementation of good corporate governance road map still faces critical 
challenges that need long-term commitment from the public and private parties.  
Changing laws and other formal rules alone may fail to achieve the desire 
outcomes or alter the status quo when such changes face with a rather stagnant 
business culture. Despite the intensive implementation of regulations on good 
 corporate governance especially a decade after Asian Financial Crisis 1997, a 
skeptical view still comes into sight on the consequences of its accomplishment in 
the Asian context (Chen, Li, & Shapiro, 2011). Looking at the low score on 
Indonesian‟s business culture as well as poor political and regulatory environment, it 
seems to suggest that it is not only a good corporate governance implementation that 
matter, the reformation of the mindset of those actors behind the implementation 
process is also very much needed. In other words, good human governance, a term 
that refers to the values, attitudes and ways of thinking and doing that bend social 
forces toward the better life of society (Salleh and Ahmad, 2008) should be given 
due consideration as well.  
One distinguishing feature of Indonesian corporate governance system is the 
two-tier corporate governance system derived from the civil law codification system. 
Within the system, there is an explicit separation between the monitoring function 
performed by the supervisory board and the operational function performed by the 
board of directors (La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes, & Shleifer, 1998). Indonesian 
corporate law system explicitly states that in conducting their fiduciary duties, the 
supervisory board oversees the board of directors (UUPT, 2007). This governance 
structure differs from the U.S. and other developed countries which follow the 
common law system. For countries which draw on the common law system, the 
operation of the company is controlled by a single board of directors and it is called 
one tier corporate governance system.  
As opposed to the single tier corporate governance system adopted by its 
neighbouring countries, the implementation of the two-tier system has made the 
Indonesian‟s governance system rather unique in the region. In particular, its legal 
origin has resulted in the adoption of a governance structure which separated the 
 monitoring and operational functions via the establishment of two independent 
boards. Judging from the two-tier structure, it creates the impression that an 
independent supervisory board appears to be more neutral and thus it is expected to 
be more effective in protecting minority shareholders‟ wealth. In contrast, La Porta 
et al. (1998) found that the common law system provides higher guarantees for 
shareholder rights and better enforceability of the rights. In addition, they also found 
that the lower degree of shareholders‟ protection is closely related to a higher control 
concentration and the lower occurrence of widely held firms (La Porta et al., 1998). 
This contrasting finding has motivated the present study to seek empirical evidence 
on the effectiveness of the two tier governance system in mitigating the problem of 
wealth expropriation in Indonesia, a developing country with a fast growing capital 
market. 
 
1.1.2 Threat of Wealth Expropriation by Controlling Shareholders 
A substantial body of empirical research shows that concentrated ownership prevails 
in most countries around the world (Anderson & Reeb, 2003; Classes, Junco, & 
Lang, 2000, 2002; La Porta et al., 1998, 1999; Lemmon & Lines, 2003). The high 
concentration of ownership together with the domination of family business and 
weak investors‟ protection will potentially create problem of wealth expropriation 
(Wolfenzon, 1999). In this sense, controlling shareholders as the dominating party 
try to extract firms‟ wealth to gain the private benefits at the expense of the minority 
investors. The imbalance position of majority shareholders versus minority 
shareholders actually represents the agency problems between the two competing 
parties. This type of agency problem is the prevalent agency problem that exists 
across the world (La Porta et al., 1999; Shleifer & Vishny, 1997). 
 Along with the concentrated ownership, the domination of family business 
often facilitates pyramidal and cross-holding structures as the means to maintain and 
enhance control of the firm by its controlling shareholders. Pyramidal structure is 
defined as the ultimate ownership of a firm running through a chain of ownership of 
intermediate corporations. Cross-holding refers to horizontal and vertical ownership 
links among corporations that can enhance the control of a large, ultimate 
shareholder (Claessens et al., 2002).  
The pyramidal and cross-holding structures allow the controlling 
shareholders to exert various self-dealing activities to expropriate firm‟s resources in 
ways that serve their own private interest at the expense of other stakeholders. This 
can be done by extracting resources from companies in which controlling 
shareholders have low cash flow rights to affiliated firms in which controlling 
shareholders have higher cash flow rights without bearing the full cost of the 
expropriation (Morck, 2003). Self-dealing activities through misappropriation of 
companies‟ assets, also known as tunneling, is a transfer of wealth from minority 
shareholders to insiders such as corporate owners, managers, or directors (Johnson, 
La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes, & Shleifer, 2000; World Bank Group, 2006). Hence, 
ownership structure concentration provides incentives for wealth expropriation. 
These acts, in turn will have negative impact on firm performance and valuation 
(Leuz, Nanda, & Wysocki, 2003; Kim & Yi, 2005).  
Empirical evidence thus far suggested that wealth expropriation has taken 
place in the form of related party transactions (Cheung, Rau, & Stouratis, 2006; 
Galerry, Gallery, & Supranowicz, 2008; Gordon, Henry & Palia, 2004; Henry, 
Gordon, Reed, & Louwers, 2007; Jian & Wong, 2006; Peng, Wei & Yang, 2006), 
dividend policy (Chen, Jian & Xu, 2009; Faccio, 2001; Lee & Xiao, 2004), debt 
 policy (Du & Dai, 2005; Faccio, Lang, & Young, 2003; La Porta et al., 1999; Nor & 
Ariffin, 2005), diversification policy (Claessens et al., 2000; Ishak & Napier, 2006; 
Khanna & Palepu, 2000), and even earnings management (Denis, 2001; Lo, Wong & 
Firth, 2009). Among the many ways to expropriate wealth, it is likely that related 
party transactions is one of the most common techniques employed by the owner 
manager (Nenova, 2005).  
Many corporate scandals that arise in the recent decade show evidence of 
self-dealing, including those that happened in the developed countries (McCahery & 
Vermeulen, 2005). In the U.S., Enron was accused of being heavily involved in 
related party transactions. A similar scandal also happened in Italy where Parmalat 
tried to hide enormous amount of debts through complicated inter-companies 
transfer. In India, companies that have unexpected high earnings have been found to 
channel extra cash disproportionately to the controlling family (Bertrand, Mehta, & 
Mullainathan, 2002).  
As self dealing problem gains attention all over the world, evolving efforts 
have been taken to curb the problem. At the international scene, the World Bank has 
been conducting the assessment of investors‟ protection in addressing corporate 
governance issues. A series of reports such as the observance standards and codes 
(ROSC) and “doing business report’’ have been published. The reports attempted to 
review the progress of corporate governance development in various countries by 
benchmarking it with code of good corporate governance of OECD (World Bank, 
2004).  
In emerging markets, the issues of self-dealing become more pressing in view 
of problems such as concentrated ownership, weaker regulation, and thin market 
which are notably absent in the developed countries. Since expropriation of minority 
 shareholders is so prevalent in developing countries, it is very important to know 
how and why it occurs. La Porta et al. (1999) suggested that the theory of corporate 
finance should also focus on the topics of expropriation in the context of agency 
relationship between controlling and minority shareholders as these are relevant to 
most countries. The majority literatures on agency theory, for instance, emphasize on 
the context of developed countries. This situation motivates the present study to 
intensively embark on the role of corporate governance in mitigating the problem of 
wealth expropriation in a developing country like Indonesia as an attempt to gain a 
clear picture on the issues and challenges facing the development of good corporate 
governance practices.  
  The rising trends in research on connected transactions in recent years have 
exacerbated the concern of these transactions on the potential abuse and their impact 
on economy (See for example: Baek, Kang & Lee, 2006; Berkman, Cole, & Fu, 
2009; Cheung et al., 2006, 2008, 2009a, 2009b; Gallery et al., 2008; Gao & Kling, 
2008; Gordon et al., 2004; Jian & Wong, 2003, 2006; Jie, 2008; La Porta et al., 
2003; Peng et al., 2006). While not all related party transactions are abusive for 
business operations (Henry et al., 2007), a scrutiny on these transactions induce a 
high risk factor that investors would consider before investment decision is made 
(Cheung, et al., 2006). The abusive transactions may lead to the national discount to 
the country‟s market as a whole (OECD, 2009). 
 
1.1.3  Self-dealings Transactions among Indonesian Business Groups 
The complexity of business groups in Indonesia has given rise to the extensive 
related party transactions among affiliated firms within the group. The main benefit 
of performing these transactions is that it can provide efficient resources allocation 
 among the connected parties as suggested by the efficient contracting view 
(Kohlbeck & Mayhew, 2010). However, looking at the low level of political and 
regulatory environment in Indonesia, exploiting those prevailing transactions 
potentially create the conflict of interest toward the benefit of controlling 
shareholders (Pizzo, 2011). In Indonesia, related party transactions is one area that is 
still largely unexplored although there are some anecdotal evidence indicating its 
pervasive abuse.  
Due to high ownership concentration in Indonesia, related party transactions 
are not given the due and necessary attention and are not sufficiently regulated 
(Nenova, 2005). A sound regulation dealing with related party transactions is 
normally required as those transactions typically engaged at market price, approved 
by board committees and should be approved by general shareholders‟ meeting for 
material transactions. In reality, however, the disclosure of related party transactions 
is still not adequate while the enforcement is still weak (Nenova & Hickey, 2006). 
One key finding of the Report on the Observance of Standards and Code 
(ROSC) from corporate governance country assessment project by a joint committee 
of World Bank and International Monetary Fund (IMF) (2004) stated that related 
party transactions among Indonesian companies are still subject to high uncertainty 
due to unclear regulation. It is recommended that Indonesia strengthen its regulation 
further. Moreover, the definition of related party transactions by BAPEPAM-LK 
(Badan Pengawas Pasar Modal dan Lembaga Keuangan) or the Capital Market and 
Financial Institution Supervisory Agency is still confusing as BAPEPAM-LK allow 
companies to rely on lawyer‟s opinion in deciding the need for disclosure on these 
transactions (Nenova, 2005). Consequently, it makes the compliance of disclosure 
 regulation on related party transactions more arbitrary in practice, allowing greater 
chances of potential abuse.  
The monitoring of related party transactions becomes more difficult as many 
companies in Indonesia are under the control of family business groups with 
complex pyramidal ownership structures. In fact, the prevalence of business groups 
in Indonesia has facilitated and encouraged more of these kinds of transaction. 
Related party transactions at Gajah Tunggal Group (See section 2.4.2 in chapter 2 for 
details), for instance, reflect the common practice of self-dealing activities prior to 
the 1997 economic crisis by business groups in Indonesia. 
Existing cross-country evidence also supported the predominance of business 
groups in emerging markets in Asia (Claessens et al., 1999; 2000) as well as in 
Continental European countries (Barca & Becht, 2001). Therefore, a study on 
business groups would be useful to shed more light about the benefits and costs of 
group affiliations since previous studies still report mixed results and are still far 
from conclusive (See for example: Claessens et al., 2002; Haidar & Khan, 2003; 
Khanna & Palepu, 2000; Sato, 2004; Wiwattakanang, 1999). As such, studying 
related party transactions in the context of firms affiliated to business groups opens 
up opportunities to examine the subject matter more closely at the heart of the 
business dealings (Chang, 2006). Therefore, unraveling related party transactions as 
a means of wealth expropriation becoming a pillar of motivation of this study. 
 
1.1.4 Political Economy of Corporate Governance in Indonesia 
The characteristics of ownership and control concentration in East Asian corporate 
system tend to be highly related to the preferential treatment to the family members 
by government. This is what Rajan and Zingales (1998) defines as “crony 
 capitalism”. In this environment, business is conducted in a system involving close 
relationship among companies, banks, and the government through ownership, 
family affiliation and political connections. In a broad sense, crony capitalism falls 
under relational-based corporate governance, the opposite of a market-based 
corporate governance (Rajan & Zingales, 1998). Since crony capitalism has led to 
little incentive for an elaborate system of good corporate governance, it may even 
reduce the ability of the legal system to protect minority shareholders effectively.  
Prior to the Asian financial crisis 1997, developing political connection is the 
viable way to secure business groups‟ interest in the centralized power of former 
President Suharto and his family circle. The patronage connections between 
politician and rent seeking interest groups have led to collusive behaviors that cause 
the inequality of wealth distribution in the national economy. Fisman (2001) pointed 
out that the value of some firms in Indonesia might have been highly dependent on 
the extent of their political connections. The disproportionate economic success of 
business groups through alliances with political regime was highlighted by Husnan 
(2001):  
“Some of the groups related to government officials have a unique share ownership. 
The officials (or their family members) often own a small portion of shares given to 
them freely as token from the controlling shareholders. By doing this, the controlling 
shareholders could maintain the special relationship with the officials, and hence, 
enjoy some kind of protection and special treatments. However, the control of the 
company is still in the hand of the founder or their family”. (Husnan, p. 28). 
 
Corporate governance reform in the aftermath of Asian crisis has become a 
crucial agenda to restore investor confidence as well as promoting growth and 
development. It is worthy to note that the success of corporate governance reform 
requires a prior shift in the balance of power away from coalitions that oppose to 
corporate governance reform towards coalitions that support the reform (Rosser, 
2003).  
 While some progress have been made since the pursuit of Indonesian 
corporate governance reform, it has not been eradicated completely the practice of 
crony capitalism. Indonesia has no clear legal regulations in barring government 
officials from having business interest when they hold position in public offices. In 
the recent political power under President Susilo Bambang Yudoyono (SBY), there 
has been a tendency of the growing mix between business and politics. During the 
first term of SBY‟s administration, some top officials like Vice President Jusuf Kalla 
and Minister Aburizal Bakri are also the owners of leading business groups in the 
country (Guerin, 2006). Therefore, this research makes an attempt to examine the 
political economy aspect of corporate governance in Indonesia. 
With the reshuffling of the business groups and the change in the ownership 
structure of public listed companies in the post-crisis period, it is still unclear as to 
what are the impacts of current situation on the protection of minority shareholders. 
Little is known whether business groups still play prominent roles in recent 
Indonesian business activities. Previous research on ownership structure in Indonesia 
were conducted as part of cross-country setting, mostly dealing with data prior to 
Asian economic crisis of 1998 (Claessens et al., 1999; 2000; 2002; La Porta et al., 
1999; Fan & Wong, 2002), while only a few studies focus specifically on Indonesia 
(Achmad et al., 2008; Lukviarman, 2004; Sato, 2003, 2004).  
 
1.2   Research Problem  
In managing the transition after the 1997 Asian Financial Crisis, the efforts of the 
government to restore investors‟ confidence and to uphold good corporate 
governance image in the Indonesian business sector has yet to yield desire outcomes. 
Despite serious commitment and effort taken by the Indonesian government to 
 restore investors‟ confidence by enforcing good corporate governance practices 
among Indonesian companies, discussions presented in section 1.1 generally 
suggested that the outcomes of the government‟s effort are still far from satisfactory. 
Lack of accountability, transparency mechanisms and poor protection of minority 
shareholders are among the agendas that need crucial attention.  
One important aspect in promoting minority shareholders‟ protection is 
corporate transparency when engaging with self-dealing activities through related 
party transactions (Young, 2005). The OECD through its Corporate Governance 
Principle (OECD, 2004, 2009) has mandated the protection of the minority 
shareholders: 
“Minority shareholders should be protected from abusive actions by, or in the interest 
of, controlling shareholders acting either directly or indirectly, and should have 
effective means of redress.” 
 
Nevertheless, the low score on the enforcement of good corporate governance 
regulation and the hindrance of business culture in Indonesia based on recent surveys 
(CLSA, 2007, 2010) indicate that the evolving efforts to strengthen the protection of 
minority shareholders is still questionable. The presence of business groups‟ 
affiliation in Indonesia with their pyramidal structure and concentrated ownership 
will induce controlling shareholders to behave opportunistically. As suggested by La 
Porta et al., (2009), pyramidal ownership structures are much more prevalent in 
countries that provide investors the weakest protections. These circumstances allow 
controlling shareholders to expropriate the companies‟ wealth at the cost of minority 
shareholders. The inefficient group affiliation can inflict a loss if there is less 
effective implementation of good corporate governance. 
While the struggle for enforcing good corporate governance principles has 
been continuing since its inception in combating expropriation of minority investors, 
 its effectiveness is still a matter of concern. Despite anecdotal evidence showing the 
detrimental effect of self-dealing activities, academic research concerning the 
potential entrenchment of related party transactions is still lacking, especially in the 
case of Indonesia. Therefore, this study intends to fill the gap by seeking evidence on 
the effectiveness of corporate governance mechanisms in protecting minority 
shareholders from the potential abuse of wealth expropriation through related party 
transactions. Hence, the underlying question is: what is the role of corporate 
governance mechanisms in resolving wealth expropriation problem?  
As highlighted in section 1.1.1 and 1.1.4, the policy decision regarding 
corporate governance cannot be separated from the country‟s legal and political 
system. The enforcement of corporate governance must also include the role of 
political and legal system in order to effectively protect the interest of minority 
shareholders (La Porta et al., 1998). The recent situation in Indonesian political 
economy, however, still points out the significance of family based system with 
political connection, a condition known as crony capitalism (Rajan & Zingales, 
1998). Leuz and Gee (2006) contended that politically connected firms are unwilling 
to share the benefits of political patronage with the minority shareholders. If this is 
the case, it can be argued that political connection is one of the primary ways to 
maintain the practice of wealth expropriation. Therefore, political connection would 
not contribute in promoting the protection of minority shareholders as mandated by 
corporate governance. To better understand this issue, the role of political connection 
to the extent of wealth expropriation will also be investigated in this research. 
 
 
 
 1.3   Research Questions 
The research questions are listed as follows: 
1. What is the nature and type of the related party transactions among Indonesian 
companies? 
2. What is the relationship between corporate governance mechanisms and the 
extent of wealth expropriation through related party transactions? 
3. What is the relationship between political connection and the extent of wealth 
expropriation through related party transactions? 
 
1.4   Research Objectives 
The overall objective of this study is to examine whether corporate governance 
mechanisms and political connection have explanatory power to influence the extent 
of wealth expropriation through related party transactions. The following are the 
specific research objectives of this study: 
1. To determine the nature and type of wealth expropriation via related party 
transactions among Indonesian companies. 
2. To examine the influence of corporate governance mechanisms on wealth 
expropriation. 
3. To examine the influence of political connection on wealth expropriation. 
 
1.5   Significance of the Study 
This research provides contribution both theoretically and practically in several 
ways. First, it provides empirical evidence on the agency theory literature with the 
test on the effect of corporate governance mechanisms based on agency conflict 
between controlling shareholders and minority shareholders in the post economic 
 crisis 1997. The original agency literature based on the conflict between manager 
and shareholders (Jensen & Meckling, 1976) might not capture the essence of this 
conflict in the Indonesian context which is characterized by concentrated ownership 
and weak investor protection. Therefore, this study provides empirical evidence by 
extending the agency theory explanation in the context of a developing country like 
Indonesia. A few prior researches in Indonesian only focused on a limited time span 
(Achmad et al., 2008, Niki, 2004), while this study intend to cover a more 
comprehensive period that cover up a decade time after the Asian Economic Crisis 
1997. 
 Secondly, this study will explore the agency relationship of controlling 
shareholder through control rights and cash-flow rights of ultimate owners. Tracing 
control chains along pyramidal structure of business groups will provide a better 
explanation for the role of ownership structure in corporate governance research. La 
Porta et al. (1999) documented ways of calculating control rights and cash-flow 
rights through tracing the control chains and it has since become a widely-used 
methodology. The use of immediate or direct ownership as carried out by previous 
research is not suitable to identify the exact controlling party in the context of 
concentrated ownership. This plan is however, to some extent hampered by problems 
with data availability and reliability in documenting the corporate control structure in 
Indonesia. Some data used by researchers in cross country setting were taken before 
the 1997 economic crisis (La Porta et al., 1999; Claessens et al., 2000, 2002), while 
this study will take the recent position in the aftermath of the Asian financial crisis. 
With the dynamic shifting on the business group structure during and after the crisis, 
it is not an easy task to observe their recent position. There is an indication that the 
 owners have incentives to intentionally split their blocks and mask their identities by 
using foreign offshore holding companies and other mechanisms (Suk, 2008).  
Thirdly, this study tries to accommodate the political economy aspect into the 
research framework. In the relationship based model of corporate governance, the 
mutual symbiosis between political power and business actors play an important role 
in determining the effectiveness of corporate governance. When such relationship is 
made through preferential access to corporate policies in favor of majority 
shareholders, then the interest of minority shareholders will be marginalized. 
Although consideration of political economy is important especially in the context of 
a developing country like Indonesia, this issue is still not much explored in the study 
of corporate governance, especially in the aftermath of the 1997 economic crisis. 
Thus, this represents another contribution of this study. 
Fourth, this study will provide further explanation about the current 
conditions of business groups as dominant players in Indonesia, both in the period of 
prior and post establishment of Indonesian Code of Corporate Governance (ICCG) in 
year 2001. By providing empirical evidence on the expropriation risk in pyramidal 
business groups, it is expected to give useful information to investors. For example, 
it is valuable for investors to consider expropriation risk through various corporate 
policies in making their investment decision.  
Lastly, this research will give contribution to the policy makers and 
regulators concerning the effectiveness of the rules and regulations enforcement. The 
potential conflict of interests between large shareholders versus minority 
shareholders should become a major agenda to regulators in the effort to protect 
minority shareholder interests. The relevant regulators such as BAPEPAM-LK as the 
security market regulator and the Indonesian Accountant Association or Ikatan 
 Akuntan Indonesia (IAI) as accounting standard regulator will benefit from the 
policy recommendations of this research. For BAPEPAM-LK which is related to the 
capital market policies, market regulation dealing with company policies should be 
directed to protecting minority shareholder interests. The current regulations on 
transaction that potentially leads to conflict of interests such as related party 
transactions must be strengthened and properly enforced.  
Ikatan Akuntan Indonesia (IAI) as the accounting standard body also can 
improve disclosure of related party transactions in financial reporting. The disclosure 
should be strengthened in order to lessen the information asymmetry as a response to 
the investors‟ need of transparency. Based on the initiative of IAI to take a full 
adoption of International financial reporting standard (IFRS) as of 2012, it is a good 
opportunity to have some improvements on current Indonesian accounting standards. 
In line with the spirit to comply globally, improvement of disclosure about related 
party transactions should clearly cover the identification and definition of related 
parties as well as the transactions conducted in order to meet the needs of 
transparency. 
 
1.6   Definition of Key Terms 
The following sub-section contains definitions and descriptions of terminology used 
in this study: 
 Business group: a number of firms owned by the same or related persons or 
family in which the member firms are tied together by stock-pyramids and cross-
ownership. 
  Corporate Governance: The process and structure used to manage the company 
towards realizing long-term shareholder value, whilst taking into account the 
interests of other stakeholders. 
 Related Party Transactions: transfer of resources or obligations between related 
parties, involving transaction between parent company and subsidiary, 
subsidiaries of common parent, an enterprise and its principal owners, 
management or members of their immediate families, and affiliates. 
 Ownership and Control: 
 Ownership is defined as the cash flow rights of the controlling shareholders.  
 Control is defined as the voting rights of the controlling shareholders.  
 Wedge Control is defined as the unequal proportion of control rights in 
excess of cash flow rights possessed by the ultimate controlling shareholders.  
 Pyramidal Holding: an entity where its ownership structure displays a top-down 
chain of control with an ultimate owner (at the apex) and followed by the 
successive lower layers of firms. 
 Two-tier board system: a system where there is an explicit separation in a 
company between operational roles as carried out by the management board and  
monitoring roles as represented by the supervisory board. 
 Multiple directorships: any individuals holding multiple board positions in 
different companies. The board can be divided to board of commissioners and 
board of directors.  
 Board of commissioner: part of corporate structure with the primary task to 
supervise and advise the board of directors in accordance with the company‟s 
article of association. 
  Director Compensation: the total annual remuneration given to board of directors. 
It consists of salary and bonus.  
 Political Connection: the extent of closeness between companies and the political 
power through various channels. 
 
 
 
 
1.7   Summary 
 
This chapter discusses the background of the study. In the introduction section, some 
issues regarding the weaknesses of Indonesian corporate governance system draw 
attention to the importance of the present study. The high level of ownership 
concentration accompanied by the domination of family business groups and the 
hindrance of business culture are some of the important aspects that cause Indonesia 
in attaining low corporate governance score in the region. These issues magnify the 
question about the effectiveness of two-tier corporate governance system in dealing 
with the problem of wealth expropriation. Another issue centered on the role of 
political connection as the weakening factor in the enforcement of good corporate 
governance. These concerns portrayed the background of the present study. They are 
then promulgated into problem statement and followed by the objectives of the 
study. The next section explains significance of the study from theoretical as well as 
practical perspectives. In the last section, the chapter provides a brief definition of 
some key terms that are relevant to the study. 
 
 CHAPTER 2 
OVERVIEW OF BUSINESS GROUPS IN INDONESIA 
 
 
2.1.  Introduction 
This chapter presents the essential explanation about the history and development of 
Indonesian business groups. The first section describes the origin and development 
of business groups. The second section explains the characteristics of business 
groups regarding the ownership structure, separation of ownership and control, 
dividend payout and financing policy. The third section deals with the overview of 
related party transactions coupled with an example on a case of these transactions. 
 
2.2. Origin and Development of Indonesian Business Groups 
The term business groups in Indonesia are generally used synonymously with 
conglomerates group. Chinese business groups are the majority group of 
conglomerates followed by several business groups developed by indigenous or 
bumiputera people (Chua, 2005). 
The emergence of business groups in Indonesia was rooted back to the period 
of colonialism. During nineteenth century, many Chinese immigrants who came to 
Indonesia turned into traders and their existence was regarded as minority 
entrepreneurs (Chua, 2008). In the post independence era, their existence were 
marginal since the government through its economic policies tends to ignore them. 
Having obtained sovereignty from the Dutch, the Indonesian government has 
attempted to support and enhance indigenous businesses with the Benteng program 
in the 1950‟s. Through this program, the government tried to cut down the 
domination of Chinese capital with the reinforcement of the nationalization policy 
and put the priority on pribumi or indigenous capital. However, the benteng program 
 failed to generate strong pribumi entrepreneurs and Chinese capital furhter expanded 
its influence (Sato, 2003). 
The new order regime under President Suharto in the beginning of 1970s 
began to promote economic development as a core policy in the Indonesian 
economic system. The government developed strategies to fuel rapid economic 
growth by allowing the entry of foreign capital and enhancing the existence of 
business groups. These groups trickled down the chain effect and created more 
employment opportunities, greater economies of scales and act as import substituted 
industries. The government allocated the scarce capital to targeted firms to develop 
labor-intensive industries in the 1970's and heavy and chemical industries in the 
1980s. The government effectively controlled major businesses by providing 
subsidized loans to large firms through nationalized banks. 
With regard to business groups in Indonesia, generally there are two major 
types of business groups, namely established group and fast growth group (Sato, 
2004). The former group refers to companies that were created before 1970s, the 
time when President Suharto came to power and established a new order regime. 
This group was developed and controlled mostly by Sino-Indonesians (Chinese 
ethnic). The founders of these business groups were usually known as tough 
entrepreneurs and they had been running their businesses for a long period of time 
before they became big conglomerates. The latter group (fast growth) emerged in the 
early 1980s and 1990s, mostly established out of government policies to create and 
develop indigenous entrepreneurs. Some of these groups were instantaneously grown 
up by facilitation and protection from political patronage. In fact, some companies 
like Humpuss, Bimantara, Citra Lamtoro, and Texmaco belong to patrons or close 
friends of President Suharto.  
 It is worthy to note that all business groups have connections with the new 
order regime under President Suharto. As noted earlier, during the first decade of his 
leadership, President Suharto strongly encouraged the establishment of large 
business groups to anchor economic growth. Therefore, the majority of business 
groups are in one way or another under the influence of political power during that 
time.  
The degree of linkage with political power among business groups is 
however, different. The relationship under patron-client network between political 
bureaucrats and conglomerates has resulted in collusive behavior (Chua, 2005). The 
bureaucrats provided some facilities in terms of industry protection, import licensing, 
preference of credit financing from state banks, and even a monopolies market. In 
return for this win-win relationship, business conglomerates would offer business 
partnerships or channel back profits to their political patrons.  
Business groups that are more intensively involved in collusive behavior are 
referred to as fast growth groups. While still maintaining political ties with the 
political power at that time, some established groups engage in less collusive 
behavior compared to fast growth group in the way that they emphasize more on 
fundamental firm performance. This strategy allowed them to survive even when 
external shock strikes the group during the economic crisis.  
The spread of monetary crisis throughout East Asian countries in 1997 
severely dented Indonesia‟s economy. Many banks faced serious liquidity crises and 
the corporate sector was experiencing high foreign debts. This condition brought the 
banking sector to collapse which led to structural break of the ownership structure in 
the private sector. In response to the crisis, the government under the monitoring eye 
of International Monetary Fund (IMF) program formed the Indonesian Banking 
 Restructuring Agency (IBRA) in January 1998. By the end of that year, IBRA closed 
66 banks, took over 11, merged 14, pushed 9 others into recapitalization program 
(IBRA, 1999). In the private sector, two institutions were established, namely the 
Indonesian Debt Restructuring Agency (INDRA) and the Jakarta Initiative. Their 
primary tasks were to coordinate the negotiation between corporate debtors and their 
creditors in restructuring debt. 
During its five years in operation until its dissolution 2004, IBRA has 
targeted the recovery rate of 28 percent of the 650 trillion rupiah (US$ 72 billion). In 
1998, the government issued 650 trillion rupiah worth of bonds, of which around 425 
trillion was earmarked for recapitalizing banks, with the rest used to repay customers 
of banks, which had been closed down. In order to achieve this target, IBRA had to 
sell the bank‟s assets as the main way to resolve the debt problem of the business 
groups. Other methods included debt rescheduling, swap of debt to bond through 
convertible bond, and swap of debt to equity (Sato, 2003). The process of banking 
and private sector restructuring has a significant impact on the major changes in the 
ownership structure. 
IBRA sold off stakes in the domestic banks it took over to raise funds, and 
allowed the entry of foreign investors to bring about better bank management 
practices in the future. For examples, the Singapore government's investment arm, 
Temasek Holdings, bought PT Bank Danamon; a consortium which includes South 
Korea's Kookmin Bank acquired PT Bank International Indonesia; while Malaysia's 
Commerce Asset-Holding Berhad gained control of PT Bank Niaga (Bhui, 2004). 
Among those holding bad debts with IBRA were the Salim Group with total 
debts of 52 trillion rupiah (US$ 6 billion) arising from the takeover of PT Bank 
Central Asia; Syamsul Nursalim of Gajah Tunggal Group, the owner of liquidated 
 PT Bank Dagang Nasional Indonesia (BDNI) with debts of 28 trillion rupiah (US$ 
3.1 billion); former president Suharto's business crony Mohammad 'Bob' Hasan with 
debts of 5.4 trillion (US$ 600 million); Usman Admadjaja of Danamon Group with 
total debts of 12.7 trillion (US$ 1.4 billion); and the Ongko Group with debts of 7.8 
trillion rupiah (US$ 860 million) (Tempo, 2002).  
As a powerful government agency, IBRA was set up to acquire and manage 
the assets from insolvent corporations. During the process of selling the assets of the 
insolvent corporations, there were criticisms that the sale decision was merely based 
on political rather than economic criteria, including pressure by former owners who 
enthusiastically wish to repurchase their assets. Through their offshore companies, 
former controlling owners bought back the assets at deep discounted prices. It is 
conjectured that such unfair connected transactions were accompanied by corrupt 
practice (payments or promises). Without these political ties, it would have been 
impossible for the former controlling owners to buy back their assets at discounted 
prices (Bhui, 2004).  
 
2.3  Characteristics of Business Groups 
2.3.1  Ownership Structure of Business Groups 
The study on business groups may be useful to shed more light about the benefits 
and costs of group affiliation as previous studies reported mixed results and are far 
from conclusive (Claessens et al., 2002; Khan, 2003; Khanna and Palepu, 2000; 
Sato, 2004; Wiwattakantang, 2001).  
It has been documented that ownership concentration among Indonesian‟s 
business group is one the highest in the East Asian Countries (Claessens et al., 
